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TORTS-AN

ACTION BASED ON STRICT TORT LIABILITY IS MAINTAINABLE AGAINST THE HOSPITAL THAT FURNISHED BLOOD CONTAMINATED

To PATIENT. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hospital, 266 N.E.2d 897 (Ill. 1970).
WITH HEPATITIS

Plaintiff was a patient at defendant's hospital, her condition having
been diagnosed as anemia' at the time of hospitalization. Plaintiff
sued defendant hospital to recover damages which she alleges were
sustained because she contracted serum hepatitis 2 as the result of
several transfusions of whole blood. Defendant maintained that plaintiff could not recover on the theory of "strict liability" averred to in her
complaint because the theory does not apply to the transfusion of whole
blood by a hospital as part of its services rendered to patients. The
trial court entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of defendant;
dismissing plaintiff's complaint. The appellate court reversed, holding that plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action
based on strict liability against the defendant.3 On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, Held-Affirmed. An action based on strict
tort liability is maintainable against the hospital that furnished blood
contaminated with hepatitis to the patient.
Prior to recent litigation most transfusion-hepatitis suits were based
upon the implied warranty theory. Implied warranty is designed to
attach liability upon the manufacturer or seller on a theory of contract.
In an action for breach of implied warranty the injured party is required to prove the product to be defective when purchased, that purchaser relied upon the implied warranties4 attached, that the product
was used as intended, and that the defect was the proximate cause of
the injury. Recovery on implied warranty is difficult, because of such
contract requirements as reliance, privity and notice, as well as the
fact that implied warranties may be excluded by a disclaimer, 5 or
1 "Anemia. A reduction below normal in the number of erythrocytes per cu. mm., the
quantity of hemoglobin, or the volume of packed red cells per 100 ml. blood which occurs
when the equilibrium between blood loss and blood production is disturbed." DORLAND'S
ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 82 (24th ed. 1965); "Acute blood loss is the commonest
and usually most emergent indication for blood transfusions." 11 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts
§ Transfusions, 332 (1961).
2 "Hepatitis. Inflammation of the liver, usually from toxic agents. Serum hepatitis is
transmitted by injection of contaminated blood or blood derivatives or merely by a needle,
lancet, or other instrument contaminated and not sterilized." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DiCTIONARY 726-27 (2d Lawyer's Ed. 1966); "In 1963, in the United States about 1.8 million
patients were transfused, and it has been estimated that the incidence of clinical transfusion hepatitis was 30,000 cases with nearly 3,600 deaths." Zucherman, A. J., Price of
Blood, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 174, 175 (1968).
8 Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 251 N.E.2d 733 (I1. App. 1969).
4 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.314; § 2.315 (1970).
5 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.316 (1970); e.g., Usual disclaimer found on package of
blood reads: "WARNING: NO LABORATORY TEST IS AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE
THE PRESENCE OF THE VIRUS OF HEPATITIS. THE RISK OF TRANSMITTING
HEPATITIS IS PRESENT. NO WARRANTIES ARE MADE OR CREATED. WARRANTIES OF FITNESS OR MERCHANTABILITY ARE EXCLUDED."
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non-applicable if the transaction is deemed a service. In order to avoid
the requirements of contract law, which often prevent recovery under
implied warranty, strict liability in tort developed. Plaintiff need only
prove that the product was defective and injury resulted therefrom
while using the product in the manner intended. 6 The Restatement
of the Law of Torts, Section 402A, imposes liability even though the
seller has exercised all possible care in preparation and sale of his product. 7 Hence, strict liablity in tort is replacing the implied warranty

theory, to insure recovery for the injured consumer."
Originally "strict liability" was imposed only on those who engaged
in inherently dangerous activities, which might injure third parties even
when all possible care was exercised. Over the years, the theory was
expanded to cover other kinds of activity, whenever the courts felt
that the injured party should not shoulder the risk of loss from defective products. 9
The case that has had the most profound effect in the transfusionhepatitis area was Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital.10 In this landmark case the court held that a blood transfusion was essentially a
"service" rather than a "sale" of goods and that plaintiff could not,
therefore, recover for breach of implied warranties attached to sales
under the State Sales Act." Other jurisdictions have followed the
12
Perlmutter "sales-service" distinction in suits against blood banks
and hospitals,' 3 holding that the transfusion of blood is a "service."
6 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962); Suvada v. White
Motor Co., 210 N.E.2d 182 (Il. 1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment
m. (1965).
7 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, 347-348 (1965):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condition in which it was
sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
8 See, Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 79 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. App. 1969); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
9 See, Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791 (1966).
10 123 N.E.2d 792 (N.Y. 1954).
11 UNIFORM SALES Acr § 15.
12 Whitehurst v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 402 P.2d 584 (Ariz. App. 1965); Balklwitsch
v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, Inc., 132 N.W.2d 805 (Minn. 1965); Cases following Perlmutterbut controlled by charitable immunity-Goelz v. J.K. & Susie L. Wadley
Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1961, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Koening v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 127 N.W.2d 50 (Wis. 1964).
13 Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Fischer v. Wilmington General Hospital, 149 A.2d 749 (Del. 1959); White v. Sarasota County Public Hospital
Board, 206 So.2d 19 (Fla. App. 1968); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc., 156 S.E.2d 923 (Ga. App.
1967); Incompatible blood cases-Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital,
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In recent years the Perlmutter reasoning seems to have lost the
acceptance it once possessed. The unsoundness of the doctrine and
its implementation has been critcized. In Russell v. Community Blood
Bank, Inc.,14 the court said: "It seems to us a distortion to take what
is, at least arguably, a sale, twist it into the shape of a service, and then
employ this transformed material in erecting the framework of a major
policy decision.'1 5 Even Perlmutter's home state chose not to characterize a ,blood transfusion as a service when presented with an action
based on express warranty.' 6
Recently the New York Supreme Court held that an action for
breach of implied warranty might lie against the blood bank, if the
facts, as developed from a full trial, so warranted it.Y7 The court re-

cognized that the transfer of blood from a blood bank to a hospital
constituted. .a sale within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial.
Code,' 8 and that the blood bank was a "merchant" with respect to the
sale of blood.19' Therefore, the court declined to dismiss the action for
breach of implied warranty, on Perlmutter's "sales-service" reasoning.
Perlmutter's"sales-service" doctrine was rejected by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, using a slightly different approach.2 0 Considering
circumstances approximating those in the present case, the court stated,
"In view of our case law implying warranties in non-sales transactions,
it cannot be said with certainty that no recovery is permissible upon
the claim ,here made, even if it should ultimately be determined that
the transfer of blood from a hospital for transfusion into a patient is
a service." 2' This decision vacated the lower court's order that an action, based on implied warranty, was not viable since the transfusion
of blood is a service. The court's decision did not consider whether a
hospital should be liable on implied warranty. However, the decision
effectively held that the technical distinction of a sale for the purposes
of implied warranties attaching to blood transfusions is unnecessary
for recovery. Implied warranties may attach to services as well as sales. 22
364 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1961); Gile v. Kennewick Public Hospital District, 296 P.2d 662 (Wash.
1956).
14 185 So.2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966), aff'd in part, Community Blood Bank, Inc. v. Russell,
196 So.2d 115 (Fla. 1967).
'5 Russell V. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So.2d 749, 752 (Fla. App. 1966).
16 Napoli v. St. Peter's Hospital of Brooklyn, 213 N.Y.S.2d 6 (N.Y. Sup. 1961).
17 Carter v. Inter-Faith Hospital of Queens, 304 N.Y.S.2d 97 (N.Y. Sup. 1969).
18 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.314 (1970) states:
(1) ... a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for
their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind...
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as ...
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used....
19 "Merchant means a person who deals in goods of the kind.
NEw YORK UNIFORM
§ 2-104(1) (1964).
20 Hoffman v. Miscericordia Hospital of Philadelphia, 267 A.2d 867 (Penn. 1970).
21 Id. at 870.
22 See, Farnsworth, Implied Warrantiesof Quality in Non-Sales Cases, 57 COLUM. L. REV.

COMMERCIAL CODE

653 (1957).
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The first jurisdiction which indicated a willingness to consider the
issue of strict tort liability applied to hospitals for blood transfusions
was New Jersey. The state supreme court reversed the lower court
which would not apply the strict tort liability theory to blood transfusions. Instead, it held that a determination could not be made until
a complete record considering the opposing public policy reasons
involved was before them.23 The case was settled prior to trial and
24
the issue remains an open question in New Jersey.
The Cunningham decision must be considered as a landmark case.
The Illinois Supreme Court considered and rejected cases heretofore
decided in the United States, presenting the same issues. Presently,
it is the only court to hold that a hospital may be liable on the theory
of strict liability. Defendant hospital argued that blood was not a
product as contemplated by the Restatement section defining seller's
liability. This reasoning was refuted by the court, relying on two
federal cases to support their position. 25 Further, the court denied
the argument that providing blood for patients is not a hospital's
primary function; therefore, hospitals were not engaged in the business
of selling a product and could not be held strictly liable. The court
used comment f. Business of Selling of the Restatement as an analogy
in disposing of defendant's contention: "The rule [strict liability]
applies to the owner of a motion picture theatre who sells popcorn or
ice cream, either for consumption on the premises or in packages to
be taken home. '26 The transfusion of blood might be incidental to the
treatment and care of patients, just as selling popcorn is incidental to
the showing of a movie; nonetheless, liability arises.
Hospitals have always sought immunity from transfusion-hepatitis
cases on the fact that no known tests were available to detect the presence of hepatitis in the blood. Here, the hospital employed the same
argument, but to no avail. The court said: "[W]hether or not defendant can, even theoretically, ascertain the existence of serum hepatitis is
of absolutely no moment. ' 27 The test for imposing strict liability is
23 Jackson

v. Muhlenberg Hospital, 249 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1969).
24 But see, Baptista v. Saint Barnabas Medical Center, 262 A.2d 902, 906 (N.J. Super.
App. Div. 1970). The court refused to apply strict tort liability to a hospital for the transfusion of incompatible blood. Although the court implied that had the blood been contaminated with the virus of hepatitis strict liability would have been applied, the reasoning
employed in this case seems untenable to support that conclusion.
25 United States v. Calise, 217 F. Supp. 705 (S.D. N.Y. 1962). Defendant wascharged with
mislabeling packages or containers ". . . of any virus, serum, toxin, antitoxin, or other
product aforesaid; . . ." under 42 U.S.C. 262(b) (1969). Defendant argued that blood was
not a serum and therefore not within § 262. The court held, "There can be no question
but that the defendants dealt in blood products for their use in the treatment of human
diseases. I, therefore, hold that the whole human blood referred to in the indictment
would constitute a 'drug' within the meaning of the statute."; United States v. Steinschreiber, 218 F. Supp. 426, 428 (S.D. N.Y. 1962) held that blood plasma was a product.
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f., 350 (1966),
1
27 Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 266 N.E.2d 897, 903 (Ill. 1970).
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whether the product was "unreasonably dangerous" for its intended
28
use, and not whether the seller can determine if the product is safe.
The fact that the seller is unaware of the defect does not alter the
29
fact that the product is defective.
Defendant further asserted that since hepatitis in blood cannot be
detected, the blood is an unavoidably unsafe product, thus an exception to strict liability. The court ruled that the exception only applies
to such commodities which are pure, but inherently dangerous. Thus,
blood in its pure state is not inherently dangerous and cannot, therefore, be considered an exception."
Perlmutter's "sales-service" doctrine was termed "unrealistic." It
seems that for purposes of strict tort liability, the term "sale" will be
given a broader definition than what would otherwise be included as a
"service" under the warranty theory. The Illinois court did in fact
3
declare that a blood transfusion constitutes a sale. 1
The significance of Cunningham cannot be over-emphasized. Application of the Cunningham rule may be utilized to include any
product the hospital provides to a patient. A federal case from Vermont
suggests that implied warranties may be attached to the administering
of an anesthetic to a patient.8 2 Further, physicians may be held liable
when furnishing some product to a patient.
Twenty-six jurisdictions 33 have enacted specific legislation to deny
recovery on the basis of implied warranty or strict liability attaching
28 See, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i. (1966).

29 See, Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 13 (1965); Keeton,
Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEXAS
L. REV. 855, 860 (1963).
30 Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 266 N.E.2d 897, 904 (Ill. 1970). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k. (1965); Gottsdander v. Cutter
Laboratories, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
81 A question arises as to whether strict tort liability would apply if the hospital
furnished the blood without a specific charge, or through the contribution of blood by a
relative. It seems that a technical sale is not required in a strict tort liability case; decisions tend to use the phrase "place into the stream of commerce" rather than "sale." See,
e.g., Delany v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964); See also Gottsdander v. Cutter
Laboratories, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell
Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401 (Ill. 1969).
82 Mauran v. Mary Fletcher Hospital, 318 F. Supp. 297 (D. Vt. 1970).
33 A.S. 45.05.100(e) (Supp. 1970); A.R.S. § 36-1151 (Supp. 1969); ARK. STAT. ANN. 85-2316-3(d) (Supp. 1965); DEERING'S CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1606 (Supp. 1971); DEL. CODE
ANN. 5A § 2-316(5) (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. para. 672.2-316(5) (Supp. 1971); KENTUCKY
REV'D STATS. ch. 139.125 (1969); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1764(b) (Supp. 1970); MAINE REV. STAT.
ANN. 11 § 2-108 (Supp. 1971); MASS. ANN. LAWS-UNIFORM COMM. CODE ch. 106, § 2-316(5)
(Supp. 1970); MICH. STATS. ANN. § 14.528(1) (1969); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7129-71 (Cum. Supp.
1970); NEB. REV. STATS. § 71-4001 (Cum. Supp. 1967); NEV. REV. STATS. § 460.010
(Supp. 1967); N.MEx. STATS. ANN. § 12-12-5 (Supp. 1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-0233(3)(d) (Supp. 1969); OHIo REY. CODE § 2108.11 (Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 63 § 2151
(Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE § 32-559 (Supp. 1970); S.D. Comp. LAWS § 57-4-33.1 (Supp. 1970);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-316(5) (Supp. 1970); TEX. Bus. & CoM. ANN. § 2.316(e) (1968); VA.
CODE ANN. § 32-364.2 (1969); W.VA. CODE § 16-23-1 (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. (1957) § 146.31

(Supp. 1971); WYo.

STAT. ANN.

§ 34-2-316(3)(d) (Supp. 1969).
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to blood transfusions. Article 2.316(e) of the Business and Commerce
Code of Texas, provides:
The implied warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not
be applicable to the furnishing of human blood, blood plasma,
or other human tissue or organs from a blood bank or reservoir
of such other tissues or organs. Such blood, blood plasma or tissue
or organs shall not for the purpose of this title be considered commodities subject to sale or barter, but shall be considered as medical services.
However, jurisdictions where such appropriate legislation does not
exist will undoubtedly be stormed by an increase of transfusion-hepatitis suits. The increase of such suits prompted the Florida legislature
into enacting legislation 4 which overruled Russell v. Community
Blood Bank.3 5 Other states, in anticipation of a flood of such suits, are
considering the passage of legislation that would define blood trans38
fusions by law as services.
Thus, Cunningham magnifies the ever-increasing legal burden
placed on hospitals. Consequently, only through legislation may hospitals find protection.
On careful analysis, it may be concluded that the theory of strict
liability was correctly applied in the Cunningham case. However, overriding public policy should predicate an exception in this area. Such
exception should not be hidden behind the illogical reasoning of the
"sales-service" theory, and does not mean a return to the era of "charitable immunity." It should be based on the premise that the public's
welfare would best be served by denying liability under implied warranty or strict liability. It is further submitted that the proper rule
in this situation should be the negligence rule.
At this time there is no test or method that will detect all hepatitis
carriers and their infected blood. Tests are available, though far from
38
accurate, 37 and hospitals should be compelled to perform such tests.

Failure to perform such tests or to employ preventive measures in the
34 FLA. STAT. ANN. para. 672.2-316(5)
85 185 So.2d 749 (Fla. App. 1966).

(1969).

86 Utah recently enacted such a law. Also Colorado and New York are considering a
similar measure. Wall Street journal, March 2, 1971, at 14, col. 3: Soon the appellate
courts of Maryland will consider the issue for the first time-John J. Schuchman v. Johns
Hopkins Hospital, Trial No. 14074-S (D. Md., filed Feb. 9, 1971).
37 See generally, A Tighter Screen on Transfusion Hepatitis, 11 MEDICAL WORLD NEWS
4 (Feb. 1970); Hepatitis-Havewe finally corralled the virus? 10 MEDICAL WORLD NEWS 39
(Oct. 1969); Rapid Detection of Australia Antigen By Cross-Over Electrophoresis, 2 THE
LANCET 368 (Aug. 1970); Shulrman, Viral Hepatitis, 72 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 257
(Feb. 1970); Shulman, Virus-like Antigen, Antibody, and Antigen-Antibody Complexes in
Hepatitis Measured by Complement Fixation, 165 SCIENCE 304 (July 1969).
88 New York State and Massachusetts require mandatory testing for the presence of
hepatitis in blood. Wall Street journal, March 2, 1971, at 14, col. 3.
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